Maine Principles of Ownership Along Water Bodies by Hermansen, Knud E. & Richards, Donald R.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 47 Number 1 Article 3 
April 2018 
Maine Principles of Ownership Along Water Bodies 
Knud E. Hermansen 
Donald R. Richards 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Knud E. Hermansen & Donald R. Richards, Maine Principles of Ownership Along Water Bodies, 47 Me. L. 
Rev. 35 (2018). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
MAINE PRINCIPLES OF OWNERSHIP
ALONG WATER BODIES
Knud E. Hermansen & Donald R. Richards
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 36
II. BOUNDARIES IN OR ALONG WATER ..................... 39
A. Boundaries along Tidal Water ....................... 39
B. Boundaries along Great Ponds ...................... 40
C. Boundaries along Nontidal Navigable Rivers or
Stream s ............................................. 41
D. Boundaries along Nonnavigable Streams ............ 44
1R. RESTRAINTS ON OWNERSHIP OF RIPARIAN LANDs ...... 45
A. Public Servitudes on Waterfront Property ............ 45
B. Unintended Limitations on Conveyed Title .......... 47
1. Bank ............................................ 48
2. Channel ......................................... 49
3. Shore ........................................... 49
4. High Water ...................................... 50
5. Low Water ...................................... 51
IV. COMMON LAW RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR
INTERPRETING COMMON WATER BOUNDARY TERMS IN
CONVEYANCES .......................................... 51
A. Common Water-Boundary Terms Used as Words of
Separation .......................................... 52
B. Specific Principles in Construing Separation of
Uplands from Lowlands ............................ 54
1. Mix of Monuments Principle .................... 54
2. Long Uncontested Possession Principle .......... 55
3. Value Apart Principle ........................... 55
4. Separated and Brought Back Principle ........... 55
5. Islands Principle ................................ 56
V. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF BOUNDARIES THAT CROSS
UNSURVEYED RIPARIAN LANDS ........................ 56
A. Competing Doctrines of Construction ............... 56
1. The Extension Method .......................... 57
2. The Proportionment Method .................... 58
3. The Colonial Method ............................ 60
4. The Perpendicular Method ...................... 63
B. Recommendation .................................... 64
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................ 68
MAINE LAW REVIEW
MAINE PRINCIPLES OF OWNERSHIP
ALONG WATER BODIES
Donald R. Richards*
Knud E. Hermansen**
I. INTRODUCrION
Some of Maine's most valuable land is found along the tidal shore
and inland bodies of water. Unfortunately, however, boundaries in,
along, or across the area between the high water to low water (or
high tide to low tide) are often unmarked, have never been sur-
veyed, and are not described accurately in attempted conveyances
(see Figure 1).1
The reasons for such shortcomings are numerous. Unaware of the
complexities of title, unsure of the extent of ownership, unwilling to
proceed through bog when dry ground was easier to walk, or unwill-
ing to claim what was worthless at the time, a surveyor often failed
to survey water boundaries for land that by common law was con-
veyed with upland property.2 Even when a surveyor was careful to
COPYRIGHT © 1995
* Donald R. Richards is a partner in the surveying firm of Richards & Cranston
located in Rockland, Maine.
** Knud E. Hermansen is an associate professor in the College of Engineering,
University of Maine. He is also a land surveyor, civil engineer, and attorney offering
consulting services in Old Town, Maine. The Authors would like to recognize and
thank Robert Yarumian II, principal in the firm of Maine Boundary Consultants,
West Buxton, Maine, for his help, review, and critique of this Article.
1. See generally State v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist., 831 S.W.2d 539,
542 (Tex. App. 1992) ("[A] surveyor usually cannot go into a stream to make a
corner, so he makes a corner on the bank in order to identify the place where he
stopped-the rule being an exception to the one which requires following the foot-
steps of the surveyor." (quoting Moore v. Ashbrook, 197 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946))). See also Haight v. Hamor, 83 Me. 453, 460-61 (1891) ("A majority of
the court is of opinion, that it is a common method of measurement in the country,
where the boundary is a stream or way, to measure from the bank of the stream or
the side of the way, and that there is a reasonable presumption that the measure-
ments were made in this way unless something appears affirmatively in the deed to
show that they began at the centre line of the stream or way." (quoting Dodd v.
Witt, 79 N.E. 475 (Mass. 1885))).
2. Along tidal water, the ownership boundary is generally the low tide boundary
or, in cases where the low tide draws more than 1650 feet below the high tide bound-
ary, a point 1650 feet seaward of the high tidal boundary. See generally Proctor v.
Hinkley, 462 A.2d 465 (Me. 1983); Richardson v. Richardson, 146 Me. 145, 78 A.2d
505 (1951); In re Hadlock, 142 Me. 116, 48 A.2d 628 (1946); Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me.
407, 152 A. 413 (1930); Sinford v. Watts, 123 Me. 230, 122 A. 573 (1923); McLellan v.
McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 95 A. 1025 (1915); Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461, 54 A.
1115 (1903); Emerson v. Taylor, 9 Me. 42 (1832); Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85
(1831). Along nontidal rivers the ownership boundary is in the center of the stream.
See Richardson v. Richardson, 146 Me. 145, 78 A.2d 505 (1951); Stuart v. Fox, 129
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Figure 1
normal high wa normal low water
Survey line and line described in description.
high watermark (tide)
shoreor flts
low water mark (tdb)
This figure shows the various "lines" along water bodies. As seen in the figure, the
boundary has been surveyed and marked along the shore. However, the land-
owner's title beyond the high water line is not described or located. Thus, the land-
owner cannot be sure what title he has along or in the water, what limitations there
are on this title, or where the boundaries cross the water.
survey the riparian boundaries, erosion, submergence, accretions,
3
the careless use of words in a description, or the simple lack of at-
tentiveness by attorneys often resulted in the erroneous identifica-
tion of ownership of shores or flats between the uplands and water
bodies. Consequently, much of Maine's riparian lands lack defini-
tive surveys in, along, or across their water boundaries, the very
boundaries that make the uplands so valuable.4
In this regard, attorneys, surveyors, and other real estate practi-
tioners will have to pay more attention to the location of the bound-
aries and title rights along water as riparian land values increase,
development intensifies, environmental restrictions expand, and the
need for public recreation grows. This need for increased attention
exists because the intensity of development along water bodies
causes expansion and crowding and raises the potential for trespass,
Me. 407, 152 A. 413 (1930); Coombs v. West, 115 Me. 489, 99 A. 445 (1916); Wilson
& Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207,77 A. 787 (1910); Proctor v. Maine Cent. R.R., 96
Me. 458, 52 A. 933 (1902); Nickerson v. Crawford, 16 Me. 245 (1839); Lowell v.
Robinson, 16 Me. 357 (1839); Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198 (1836); Graves v. Fisher, 5
Me. 69 (1827). Along great ponds, the ownership boundary is along the normal low
water line at the time of the original conveyance. See Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24,71
A.2d 55 (1950); Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198 (1836); Hathorne v. Stinson, 12 Me. 183
(1835).
3. See King v. Young, 76 Me. 76,79 (1884) ("It seems to be settled both in Eng-
land and in this country that the land of a riparian proprietor may be increased by
accretion.").
4. See generally Babson v. Thinter, 79 Me. 368, 371, 10 A. 63, 64 (1887) ("The
colonial government of the mother commonwealth granted the great boon to land-
holders without much thought or intimation about the manner of dividing the flats
among its grantees.").
MAINE LAW REVIEW
clashing uses, confrontation, and litigation. The recent case, Bell v.
Town Of Wells,5 is a good example of the intensity and magnitude of
the confrontation that has occurred, and more than likely will con-
tinue to occur, along Maine's water bodies, leading to increased de-
mand for competent legal counsel. For example, clients seeking
legal counsel concerning shoreland zoning, permits, use of riparian
property, and improvements such as docks already have increased
dramatically in number. Attorneys must be able to counsel their
clients on ownership and public or private rights associated with ri-
parian lands. To do so they need to understand riparian title rights
as well as the probable location of boundaries along, within, or
across the water body involved.
The present day practitioner is likely involved with development
and recreation, while in the past practitioners dealing with riparian
rights typically faced questions of property rights arising from fish-
ing weirs, clamming, logging, shipping, ice cutting, and commercial
water transport. From these historical practices and conflicts, vari-
ous rules of construction regarding the extent and location of title
evolved.6
This Article provides a summary of the Maine common law of
riparian boundaries. It is geared toward practitioners who practice
or provide counsel in the area of real property law or who must
litigate boundaries and title rights involving water bodies. This Arti-
cle also includes recommendations for fixing previously undefined
boundaries across water. However, readers should be aware that
this Article does not attempt to provide an exhaustive survey of all
riparian law. In recent years state and federal legislation has further
limited or restricted specific landowner common law rights along
water bodies.7
5. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) (holding that the public's right to use certain private
beach areas in the Town of Wells does not include swimming, sunbathing, or picnick-
ing, such use amounts to trespass on the private owner's property).
6. See e.g., Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407,413, 152 A. 413,415-16 (1930) (discussing
the historical foundations of title along tidal water).
7. An example is state and federal wetlands legislation denying or limiting im.
provements in wetlands. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 323 (1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
30-A, § 4401(2-A) (Pamph. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 480-B(4) (West
1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 957-B (West 1989). Another recent example
of state legislation affecting waterfront property is shoreland zoning. See, e.g., ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4404 (Pamph. 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 482(4-F) (West 1989). Other state and federal legislation restricts the construction
of docks, dams, vegetation removal, and the availability and cost of insurance in the
100-year flood plain as determined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
See e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 2501 (West 1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, § 436-A(4) (West 1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 631 (West 1989).
[Vol. 47:35
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II. BOUNDARIES IN OR ALONG WATER
Maine common law has recognized four categories of water bod-
ies in regard to title and title rights: 1) tidal waters, 2) great ponds,
3) nontidal navigable rivers or streams, and 4) nonnavigable
streams. It is necessary to understand these four categories in order
to deal with disputes concerning them.
A. Boundaries along Tidal Water
Tidal water is defined as any body of water that is naturally influ-
enced by the ebb and flow of the tide.' Tidal waters include rivers
from their mouths to the point upstream where the ebb and flow of
the tides are negligible.9 The common law presumption is that a
conveyance of land bounded by tidal water will convey title to the
low tide mark or to 1650 feet (100 rods' 0), whichever is closer to the
high tide line (see Figure 2).il This presumption of tidal water
boundary applies equally to all lands along the ocean, bays, and riv-
ers affected by the tides, even though the tidal river water may con-
tain fresh rather than brackish or salty water.12
The line of low tide may fluctuate because of accretions and ero-
sion. An owner's lands will increase or decrease accordingly. 3 Be-
yond the low tide or beyond 1650 feet, whichever is closer to high
tide, the State has title. 4
8. See generally Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
9. See generally Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85 (1831).
10. The rod, pole, or perch is an ancient surveying measurement used for land
descriptions up to the mid-twentieth century. There are 16.5 feet in a rod. For more
information on surveying measurements, see Knud E. Hermansen, When is a Rod
Not 16.5 Feet?, PROBATE AND PROPERTY, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 8.
11. See Emerson v. Taylor, 9 Me. 42, 43 (1832) ("[]n all creeks, coves and other
places about and upon salt water, where the sea ebbs and flows, the proprietor of the
land adjoining shall have propriety to the low-water-mark, where the sea doth not
ebb above a hundred rods, and not more, wheresoever it ebbs further." (quoting the
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 1641)). See also In re George Hadlock, 142
Me. 116,119,48 A.2d 628,630 (1946); Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407,412. 152 Aid 413,
415 (1930); Sinford v. Watts, 123 Me. 230,232, 122 A.2d 573,574 (1923); McLellan v.
McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 246, 94 A.2d 1025, 1027-28 (1915); Dunton v. Parker, 97
Me. 461, 467-68, 54 A.2d 1115, 1118 (1903); Erskine v. Moulton, 84 Me. 243, 247-48,
24 A.2d 841, 842 (1892); Stevens v. King, 76 Me. 197, 199 (1884); Lapish v. Bangor
Bank, 8 Me. 85, 91 (1831).
12. Stone v. Augusta, 46 Me. 127, 137 (1858) (Stone makes it clear that the intent
of the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance is directed at the ebbing and flowing of the
tide and not at whether the nature of the water is fresh, brackish, or salty.). See also
Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. at 93 (1831).
13. Bell v. Town Of Wells, 557 A.2d at 175 n.18 (Me. 1989) (citing King v. Young,
76 Me. 76 (1884)).
14. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. 82-83; Wilson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207,77 A.2d
787 (1910); State v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist., 831 S.W.2d 539,544 (Tex.
1992).
1995]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
Figure 2
Low Tide
lats, marsh,
1,60 ft Ownership Line
Uplands
This figure demonstrates that the line of ownership ordinarily goes along the low
tide line unless the distance from the low tide line to the high tide line exceeds 1650
feet. Where the fiats extend beyond 1650 feet from the high tide line, the ownership
line will coincide with a parallel line crossing the flats at a distance 1650 feet from
the high tide line.
B. Boundaries along Great Ponds
A great pond is defined as any body of standing water with a sur-
face area of ten acres or more.15 Title along a great pond extends to
the seasonal normal and natural low water line at the time of the
original conveyance. 6 Consequently, if the water of a great pond
has receded or been raised by artificial means since the time of the
original conveyance, the upland owner neither gains nor loses prop-
erty. 7 Beyond the normal low water line as it stood at the time of
conveyance, title rests with the State (see Figure 3).18
15. Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 28, 71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950). See also ME. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 436-A(7) and 480-B(5) (West 1989).
16. Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 71 A.2d 55 (1950); Stevens v. King, 76 Me. 197
(1884); Wood v. Kelly, 30 Me. 47 (1849); Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198 (1836);
Hathorne v. Stinson, 12 Me. 183 (1835).
17. Lowell v. Robinson, 16 Me. 357, 361 (1839) ("In the case of Hathorne v.
Stinson, 3 Fairf. 183, it was decided by this Court, that a lot of land bounded upon a
pond artificially raised by the flowing of a stream by a mill dam, was not limited to
the margin of the pond, but included the land thus flowed."). The same rule Is ex-
pressed in the case of Waterman v. Johnson, 30 Mass. 261 (13 Pick. 1832). See also
Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198 (1836); Hathorne v. Stinson, 12 Me. 183 (1835).
18. See Op. Me. Att'y Gen. supra note 14, at 2 (citing Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24,
28, 71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950)). See also Barrett v. Rockport Ice Co., 84 Me. 155, 156, 24
A. 802 (1891) (Ponds containing more than ten acres are known as public great
ponds, and the State holds them, as well as the soil under them, in trust for the
public.).
[Vol. 47:35
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Figure 3
Along a great pond the landowner's title ordinarily would reach to the low water
line. Beyond the low water, title remains with the State of Maine. Between the low
and high waters, the common law establishes an easement permitting limited public
use, as explained in Part III of this Article.
C. Boundaries along Nontidal Navigable Rivers or Streams
Nontidal navigable rivers or streams are defined as flowing bodies
of water capable of being used for reasonable public transportation
or commercial use some time during the year for some reasonable
part of their length.19 Maine common law imposes upon nontidal
19. In Maine, the floating of rafts and logs appears to be a critical commercial use
defining "navigable" rivers, the term "float a log" being almost synonymous with
"navigable." Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 20-22 (1849) held:
[W]here a stream is naturally of sufficient size to float boats or mill logs, the
public have a right to its free use for that purpose. But such little streams or
rivers as are not floatable, that canno4 in their natural state; be used for the
carriage of boats, rafts, or other property, are wholly and absolutely private;
not subject to the servitude of the public interest, nor to be regarded as
public highways, by water, because they are not susceptible of use, as a
common passage for the public.
The distinguishing test between those rivers which are entirely private
property, and those which are private property subject to the public use
and enjoyment, consists in the fact, whether they are susceptible, or not, of
use as a common passage for the public.
The true test.., is whether a stream is inherently and in its nature,
capable of being used for the purposes of commerce, for the floating of
vessels, boats, rafts or logs. When a stream possesses such a character, then
the easement exists, leaving to the owners of the bed, all other modes of
use, not inconsistent with it.
In the test.., to determine whether a stream should be considered pub-
lic, none of the authorities, from which it is derived, requires the stream to
possess the quality of being capable of use, during the whole year.
(emphasis added)
See also ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 480-B(9) (West 1989); Mn. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, § 436-A(11A) (West Supp. 1994-95); Card v. Nickerson, 150 Me. 89, 104 A.2d
1995]
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navigable streams a public easement for such reasonable transporta-
tion or commercial use.2" Conveyance of land bounded by a non-
tidal river or stream will convey title out to the "thread" of the main
stream (see Figure 4).21 In Maine, the thread of the stream is de-
fined as a line equally distant from the banks' sidelines at the "natu-
ral and ordinary" stage of the water (see Figure 4).2
427 (1954). See generally Widson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207, 77 A.2d 787
(1910); Smart v. Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37,46,68 A. 527 (1907); Woodman v. Pitman,
79 Me. 456, 1 A. 342 (1887); Parsons v. Clark, 76 Me. 476 (1884); Davis v. Winslow,
51 Me. 264 (1863); Gerrish v. Brown, 51 Me. 256 (1863); Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552
(1856).
20. See Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. at 20.
21. See Richardson v. Richardson, 146 Me. 145,78 A.2d 505 (1951); Stuart v. Fox,
129 Me. 407, 152 A. 113 (1930); Coombs v. West, 115 Me. 489, 99 A. 445 (1916);
Charles C. Wilson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207, 77 A. 787 (1910); Proctor v.
Maine Cent. R.R., 96 Me. 458, 52 A.2d 933 (1902); Stevens v. King, 76 Me. 197
(1884); Nickerson v. Crawford, 16 Me. 245 (1839); Lowell v. Robinson, 16 Me. 357
(1839); Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198 (1836); Graves v. Fisher, 5 Me. 69 (1827).
In Mansur v. Blake, 62 Me. 38 (1873), the court stated:
Fresh water rivers, of what kind soever, do, of common right ... belong to
the owners of the soil adjacent; so that the owners of one side have of
common right the propriety of the soil, and consequently the right of fish-
ing, usque filum aquae; and the owners of the other side the right of soil,
ownership and fishing unto the filum aquae on their side. Prima facie, the
owner of each bank of a stream is the proprietor of half the land covered
by the stream. The conveyance of land bounded upon a highway or...
stream, carries the grantee to the centre, unless there be decided and con-
trolling or specific description showing a contrary intent.
Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
22. In Warren v. Thomaston, 75 Me. 329 (1883), the court noted:
In case of fresh water streams, when such stream is the boundary, the deed
passes the fee to its centre. The words to the stream, thence up or down
the river, in a deed pass a title to the thread of the stream.... The general
rule is, that when the river is the boundary, the grantee takes usque ad
filum aquae, unless the river be expressly excluded from the grant by the
terms of the deed.
Id. at 331 (citations omitted).
The Warren case gives a complete analysis of the difference between the thread and
the channel of a river or stream, and it gives specific definitions for each. The War-
ren court stated:
The channel is the deepest part of the river. It is the navigable part-the
water road over which vessels pass and repass. It is the highway of com-
merce. Had the line run to the river and down the river, the boundary
would have been the thread of the stream-the filum aquae. But, the
thread of a stream is the middle line between the shores, irrespective of the
depth of the channel, taking it in the natural and ordinary stage of water.
The channel and the thread of the river are entirely different. The channel
may be one side of the thread of the river or the other.
Id. at 332.
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Figure 4
Line equi-distant from natural and ordinary
water lit-
Natural & Ordinary Edge of'
The cross section of a typical stream is not uniform. Consequently, a line equidistant
from the natural and ordinary water lines cannot be expected to reside in the chan-
nel or deepest part of the stream. At times the line will approach one bank or the
other and sometimes even cut across a bank that is exposed during times of low
water.
Figure 5
water line
edge of water
In Figure 5 the low water has exposed an island in the river, blocking an upland
owner from access to the main channel.
During times of unusually low water the owner will not have access
to the water if the ownership boundary at the thread crosses land
exposed by drought and cuts off the property before the water's
edge (see Figure 5).P
23. See generally id. (holding that the channel and the thread of rivers and
streams often do not coincide; they may even vary injlocation to such an extent that
when the thread is the boundary, the proprietor of the upland on one side of a river
1995]
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The rule of conveyance for nontidal navigable streams also ap-
plies to artificially created ponds (see Figure 6).' The boundary of
the conveyed riparian property is the thread of the stream as it ex-
isted before the pond was created.25
Figure 6
Pond's edge
The erection of a dam across a stream will not shift the boundary in a stream unless
an operative conveyance expressly calls for a different boundary location.
D. Boundaries along Nonnavigable Streams
A nonnavigable stream is defined as a flowing body of water inca-
pable of supporting reasonable public transportation or commercial
use at any time during the year.2 6 Many times such a stream has an
intermittent flow of water. Maine common law treats boundaries
along such nonnavigable streams the same as nontidal navigable
streams, except no public servitude is imposed on a nonnavigable
stream.27
or stream may not have frontage touching the water in the channel when the level of
the water body is lowered in times of drought). See also Graves v. Fisher, 5 Me. 69
(1827).
24. See Mansur v. Blake, 62 Me. 38, 41 (1873); Lowell v. Robinson, 16 Me. 357,
361 (1839); Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198, 201 (1836).
25. In many cases, title to the fee or to an easement is conveyed to the mill owner
so flowage may occur without trespass. In Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. at 201, the court
stated: "Had the land been bounded upon a river or stream, or upon an artificial
pond created by expanding a stream by means of a dam, the riparian proprietor
would go to the thread of the stream. This is law well settled and understood." See
also Lowell v. Robinson, 16 Me. at 361, in which the court noted:
[I]t was decided by this Court, that a lot of land bounded upon a pond
artificially raised by the flowing of a stream by a mill dam, was not limited
to the margin of the pond, but included the land thus flowed. The same
opinion is expressed in the case of Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261, with
a possible qualification, that the pond may have acquired by becoming per-
manent another well defined boundary.
26. See Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 71 A.2d 55 (1950); Wilson & Son v. Harris-
burg, 107 Me. 207,77 A. 787 (1910); Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37,68
A. 527 (1907). See generally Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 2 (1858); Treat v. Lord, 42
Me. 552 (1856); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 2 (1849).
27. See generally Davis v. Winslow, 51 Me. 264 (1863); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31
Me. 2 (1849).
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III. RESTRAINTS ON OWNERSHiP OF RIPARIAN LANDS
When a parcel of land adjoins a water body, the landowner does
not necessarily have exclusive use and dominion over the area adja-
cent to the water's edge. In some situations a public servitude exists
on part of the exposed land along the water. In other cases a con-
veyance intentionally, or unintentionally, omits title to shorelands,
thus denying the landowner the right to use the area immediately
adjacent to the water in any way other than as a general member of
the public.
A. Public Servitudes on Waterfront Property
Public servitudes are imposed on all riparian property in Maine
with the exception of land along nonnavigable streams. Along a
tidal water or great pond the public servitude extends from the nor-
mal high tide or water to the normal low tide or water.' On naviga-
ble streams the public servitude extends from normal high water on
one side to normal high water on the opposite side.' Public servi-
28. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); Flood v. Earle, 145 Me.
24, 71 A.2d 55 (1950) (intertidal public easements for specific activities conferred by
Massachusetts Colonial Ordinances).
29. Op. Me. Att'y Gen. supra note 14, at 3 ("The waters of the State... are held
in trust by the State for the use of its people."). There appears to have been a
certain traditional de minimus privilege to trespass allowed to drivers who traveled
along stream banks to keep logs moving downstream. Note the following, however
The public are not entitled to tow on the banks of ancient navigable rivers,
at common law. And where a river cannot be used without towing, or go-
ing upon its banks to propel what is floating, such fact would evince its
want of capacity, in itself, for public use.
Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 2,25 (1849) (citing Ball v. Herbert, 100 Eng. Rep. 560
(K.B. 1789)).
The use of stream banks was further discussed in 1856:
The stream, in order to have the character of a public highway, must, in
and of itself, have a capacity for floating logs. Such a stream, as well as our
larger rivers, will, as experience has universally shown, from its windings,
and the rush of its waters especially in times of freshets, cast many of the
logs which float upon its bosom, upon its shores, intervales and banks,
thereby rendering it necessary to go upon such uplands for the purpose of
making a clean drive. Such incidental necessity neither enlarges nor dimin-
ishes the natural capacity of the stream, nor in any way affects its public
character. To meet such necessity, it is proved by the Revised Statutes, c.
67, §§ 10 and 11, that all logs or other timber, lodged upon any lands ad-
joining any waters within this State, shall, in certain contingencies, and
upon certain conditions, be forfeited to the owner or occupier of such
lands; and that the owner of such timber may at any time before such for-
feiture, enter on said lands and remove the same, by tendering a reason-
able compensation for all damages as the statute requires. While,
therefore, it is true, that persons driving logs may go upon the banks of our
public streams and rivers, as necessity may require, it is also true, that a
stream, which is so small and shoal in its bed, that no logs can be driven in
it, without being propelled by persons traveling on its banks, is private
property, and not subject to such public servitude as is claimed in this
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tude on riparian property along tidal water, great ponds, or naviga-
ble streams may be summarized as the public right to fish, fowl, and
navigate (and historically to cut ice).' In addition to the general
public right to fish, fowl, and boat on all waters other than streams,
on great ponds the public has an additional, but limited, right to
cross the shoreland to gain access to the pond.31 The Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has interpreted
"fish, fowl, and navigate" to encompass skating, digging worms,
clamming, floating logs, landing boats, mooring, and sleigh travel,
among other activities. 32 These public servitudes, which evolved
case.... The right of the public so to use a stream or river for the purposes
of commerce, rests in the intrinsic capability of its waters for such use, and
is in no way dependent upon the necessity of using its banks.
Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552, 563-64 (1856).
30. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); McFadden v. DeWitt Ice Co.,
86 Me. 319, 29 A. 1068 (1894); Warren v. Westbrook Co., 86 Me. 32, 29 A. 927
(1893); Barrett v. Rockport Ice Co., 84 Me. 155,24 A. 802 (1891); Stevens v. Kelley,
78 Me. 445, 6 A. 868 (1886); McPheters v. Moose River Log Driving Co., 78 Me. 329,
5 A. 270 (1886); Matthews v. Treat, 75 Me. 594 (1884); Davis v. Winslow, 51 Me. 264
(1863); Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472 (1854); Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union
Wharf, 26 Me. 384 (1847); Low v. Knowlton, 26 Me. 128 (1846); Deering v. Proprie-
tors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51 (1845); Parker v. The Cutler Milldam Co., 20 Me. 353
(1841). These cases all deal with defining the activities included within the public's
right to fish, fowl, and navigate.
31. Ponds containing more than ten acres are known as "great ponds."
They are public ponds. The state holds them and the soil under them in
trust for the public. The public, in the absence of statute, have the right to
fish and fowl and to cut ice upon them, by virtue of the Colonial Ordinance
of 1641, provided the citizen can reach the pond by "passing to it on foot
without trespassing upon any man's corn or meadow.'
Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 28, 71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950) (quoting Conant v. Jordan, 107
Me. 227, 77 A. 938 (1910)).
It is interesting to note, however, that a person may go freely across woodland,
brush, or bog to reach the pond. This right is codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 3860 (West 1983), which states:
No person on foot shall be denied access or egress over unimproved land
to a great pond except that this provision shall not apply to access or egress
over the land of a water company or a water district when the water from
the great pond is utilized as a source for public water.
The Attorney General shall, upon complaint of a person being denied
said access or egress, if in his judgment the public interest so requires, pros-
ecute criminally or civilly any person who denies such right of access or
egress.
Any person may maintain an action in the Superior Court having juris-
diction where the alleged denial of access or egress occurred or is likely to
occur for declaratory and equitable relief and actual and punitive damages
against any person, partnership, corporation or other legal entity for any
violations of this section.
Whoever violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $100 and by imprisonment for not more than 90 days.
32. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989). Bell deals most thor-
oughly with the public rights permitted and not permitted in the intertidal zone. In
Bell the court listed the permitted uses as follows:
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from commercial use, do not involve any depletion or damage to
soil or chattels33 and do not include the right of the public to wash,
swim, picnic, or sunbathe. 4
B. Unintended Limitations on Conveyed Tile
Historically, title to the area immediately bordering water was
valuable for such activities as harvesting salt grass, cutting ice,
booming logs, swimming, and sunbathing.35 The right to engage in
these activities, carried on near the water, was deemed to belong to
the riparian owner and was not considered part of any public right.
As a consequence, title to the land area immediately bordering a
water body sometimes intentionally was separated from title to the
uplands so a party could be conveyed property on which he could
exercise rights of flooding, booming logs, or cutting salt grass with-
out having to acquire the uplands as well.3 6 Problems with title can
arise when shorelands are intended to be separate from uplands in a
Others may sail over them, may moor their craft upon them, may allow
their vessels to rest upon the soil when bare, may land and walk upon
them, may ride or skate over them when covered with water bearing ice,
may fish in the water over them, may dig shell fish in them, may take sea
manure from them, but may not take shells or mussel manure or deposit
scrapings of snow upon the ice over them.
Il at 174 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536, 45. A.
497, 498 (1900)). See also Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472 (1854).
33. See, e.g., Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 456, 10 A. 321 (1887). It was noted in
King v. Young, 76 Me. 76, 80 (1884) that:
[T]he owner of adjoining land can maintain trespass quare clausum fregit
against one who enters upon the flats and takes and carries away mussel-
bed manure and that neither the ordinance of 1641-7 nor the common law,
authorizes the taking of mussel-bed manure from the flats of another per-
son between high and low water mark on tide waters.
In Pearson v. Rolfe, 76 Me. 380, 386 (1884), the court held that the user of the
public rights in navigable waters could not remove rocks or obstructions, move soil
in the stream bed, remove quarried stone, or remove ice from a fresh water stream.
In Moore v. Griffin, 22 Me. 350, 355-56 (1843), the court held that the taking of
sand, sea manure, and ballast are not allowed under the ordinance and that, "The
language of the reservation in the ordinance cannot be extended beyond the obvious
meaning of the words fishing and fowling." In the case of Bagott v. Orr, 2 B&P. 472,
it was held that although the right to take shellfish on the shore by the common law
was admitted, the right to take shells was not. Neither the ordinance nor the com-
mon law would authorize the taking of "mussel-bed manure" from the land of an-
other person. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) would appear to allow
the taking of sea manure but not mussel-bed manure. See also Marshall v. Walker,
93 Me. 532, 98 A. 115 (1900).
34. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Vells, 557 A.2d at 175-76 (specifically excluding
public bathing, sunbathing, general recreation and walking, except where incidental
to fishing, fowling, or navigation, from the rights of the public in the intertidal zone).
See also Charles C. Wilson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207, 77 A. 787 (1910).
35. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 173-76.
36. Cf. Littlefield v. Littlefield, 28 Me. 180 (1848); Nickerson v. Crawford, 16 Me.
245 (1839).
1995]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
conveyance. For example, the citation, or call,37 in the deed descrip-
tion for a "bank," "shore," "beach margin," or other tangible
landmark may be used by a scrivener intending to separate the
water from the uplands. These terms provide a tempting physical
limit to mark the separation of the land from the water. Conse-
quently, such terms may be employed in a deed intending to stop
ownership short of, or at, the high water.38 The same attributes that
make these physical and tangible points valuable as markers, how-
ever, also cause them to be used as rough points of reference by a
deed drafter who has no intention at all that they serve as refined
lines of limitation or separation.39 The appearance of such terms in
a deed can be confusing. An analogy could be made to a person
describing the location of a house as being "at the intersection of
Main and Oak Streets." The intent could be only to convey enough
information to bring another within sight of the house, not to have
him believe the house stands literally in the intersection.
Certain monuments near water bodies, such as "bank," "chan-
nel," "shore," "high-water," and "low water," have been used in this
ambiguous way to such an extent that the Law Court has devoted
significant effort to explaining the problems with these terms. It is
thus essential that the practitioner understand such terms and their
potential for confusion so they are not used loosely, with unintended
lines of limitation resulting. For example, a description that states,
in part, "to the pond's shore, thence along the shore" leaves the
exact location of the ownership line along the water in doubt. The
following definitions may be of assistance in treating ambiguous
shoreland references with appropriate specificity.
1. Bank
The term "bank" refers to the rise in topography found along the
edge of water bodies, particularly freshwater." Since most banks
have a width composed of a gradual slope, starting at the water and
extending uphill several feet, confusion occurs regarding where the
line of ownership lies-at the top, middle, or bottom of the bank.
To assign a boundary by using a term referencing such a broad width
is to invite controversy, and its use should be avoided.
37. The word "call" refers to a reference in a land survey or deed to an object,
measurement, monument, or other detail describing an accompanying physical attri-
bute on the land.
38. Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Me. 169 (1848); Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85
(1831).
39. Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Me. 169 (1848); Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85
(1831).
40. See generally Stone v. Augusta, 46 Me. 127 (1858).
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2. Channel
The channel, or thalweg, is the deepest part of the stream, where
the stream would flow if any water moved at all.' The channel is
not synonymous with the thread of the stream.42 The channel by
happenstance may be the thread of the stream, but that occurs only
by chance, as when a raindrop that falls into a cup strikes the exact
center of the cup. The practitioner who uses "channel" for a bound-
ary is choosing what cannot be seen, since the line of the channel is
visible only when water barely flows.
3. Shore
The shore is the land between the ordinary low stage and ordinary
high stage of the water.43 This area also is known as flats, intertidal
zone, foreshore, beach, or the beachfront area." In at least one
case the "shore" has been held to be synonymous with the "bank. 45
The shore has two edges, high water and low water, delineating be-
tween them an area of measurable width.' The term "shore"
41. See generally State v. Ecklund, 23 N.W.2d 782 (Neb. 1946); Lincoln v. Wilder,
29 Me. 169 (1848).
42. The channel is the deepest part of the river. It is the navigable part-
the water road over which vessels pass and repass. It is the highway of
commerce. Had the line run to the river and down the river, the boundary
would have been the thread of the stream-the filum aquae. But, the
thread of a stream is the middle line between the shores, irrespective of the
depth of the channel, taking it in the natural and ordinary stage of water.
The channel and the thread of the river are entirely different. The channel
may be one side of the thread of the river or the other.
Warren v. Thomaston, 75 Me. 329,332 (1883). But cf. Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9,
11 (1858); Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Me. 169, 179-80 (1848).
43. Proctor v. Hinkley, 462 A2d 465,473 n.6 (Me. 1983); Hodgdon v. Campbell,
411 A.2d 667, 672 (Me. 1980); McLellan v. McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 95 A. 1025
(1915); Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461,467,54 A. 1115, 1118 (1903); Proctor v. Rail-
road Co., 96 Me. 458,472,52 A. 933, 937 (1902); Abbott v. "fteat, 78 Me. 121,123,3
A. 44 (1886); Littlefield v. Littlefield, 28 Me. 180, 184 (1848). Lapish v. Bangor
Bank, 8 Me. 85, 89-90 (1831) (quoting Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810))
adopted the following definition:
The sea shore must be understood to be the margin of the sea, in its usual
and ordinary state. Thus when the tide is out, low water mark is the margin
of the sea, and when the sea is full, the margin is high water mark. The sea
shore is, therefore, all the ground between ordinary high water mark and
low water mark.
44. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 169 n.3 (Me. 1989); Littlefield v. Little-
field, 28 Me. 180, 185 (1848). See also ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 572 (West
1994).
45. Proctor v. Hinkley, 462 A.2d 465, 473 n.6 (Me. 1983). But see Proctor v. Rail-
road Co., 96 Me. 458, 477, 52 A. 933 (1902) (citing Morrison v. First Nat'l Bank, 88
Me. 155, 33 A. 782 (1895)).
46. Sinford v. Watts, 123 Me. 230,232, 122 A. 573, 574 (1923); Dunton v. Parker,
97 Me. 461, 467, 54 A. 1115, 1118 (1903); Abbott v. Treat, 78 Me. 121, 123, 3 A. 44,
45 (1886).
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should not be used to fix a boundary because the point of ownership
along the width of land that compromises the "shore" is uncertain.
Figure 7
Permanent Vegetation
Present WaterLevel " Normal High Water
Along water bodies, normal high water is the edge of the permanent vegetation.
Oftentimes the actual water level is found at some lower level.
4. High Water
High water, generally synonymous with normal high water, is the
line reached by the water when the water body is ordinarily full and
the water ordinarily high.47 The line is normally marked by the
scour line, which is the line between permanent vegetation and soil
or rock swept clean of vegetation by the action of the water (see
Figure 7).48 High water is not the highest point touched by the
water in a storm or abnormal flooding, but the highest limit reached
when the water maintains its natural and usual flow.49 Because this
is not generally understood, confusion arises when the term "high
water" is employed to fix a boundary; its use should be avoided.
47. See, e.g., Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384, 396 (1847).
48. See Proctor v. Hinkley, 462 A.2d 465 (Me. 1983).
49. [T]he line on the river bank reached by the water when the river is
ordinarily full and the water ordinarily high. Not the highest point touched
by the water in a freshet... but the highest limit reached when the river is
unaffected by freshets and contains its natural and usual flow; the highest
limit at the ordinary state of the river .... Sometimes it may be "the line
which the river impresses upon the soil by covering it for sufficient periods
to deprive it of vegetation and to destroy its value for agriculture," while in
other cases "it can only be ascertained by careful observation."
Proctor v. Hinkley, 462 A.2d 465,470 n.4 (Me. 1983) (quoting Morrison v. First Nat'l
Bank, 88 Me. 155, 161,33 A. 782,784 (1895)). See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 436-A(9) (West 1964); ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 480-B(6) (West 1964); Get-
rish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384 (1847).
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5. Low Water
Low water is the level to which the tide ebbs on its out-flow. 50
The low water line along a stream or great pond is the line the water
recedes to during summer months.51
IV. COMMON LAW RuLEs OF CONSTRUCTION FOR
TNTERPRETING COMMON WVATER BOUNDARY TERMS IN
CONVEYANCES
As a consequence of the historically careless use of water bound-
ary terms by laypersons and practitioners alike, the courts have
adopted certain rules of construction governing their interpretations
in conveyances.' When the intent of the drafter is clear from the
context of the transaction or from the instrument itself, that express
intent will control.5 When the intent is unclear and controversial,
certain other rules of construction govern.-4
In general, Maine courts have been reluctant to interpret a con-
veyance as separating the lowlands from the uplands.5" Uplands
and shorelands benefit each other to such an extent that separation
goes against common sense.56 The presumption therefore is against
separation unless the conveyance expresses explicit intent other-
wise.57 Words such as "by," "along," or "side" are insufficient by
50. See generally Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384 (1847).
51. Id.
52. The rules of construction applicable to navigable waters are similar, and
many times the same, as rules pertaining to roads. See Warren v. Thomaston, 75 Me.
329 (1883).
53. Proctor v. Hinkley, 462 A.2d 465 (Me. 1983); McLellan v. McFadden, 114 Me.
242, 95 A.2d 1025 (1915); Wilson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207, 77 A. 787
(1910); Brown v. Heard, 85 Me. 294,27 A. 182 (1893); Haight v. Hamor, 83 Me. 453,
22 A. 369 (1891); Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9 (1858); Pike v. Monroe, 36 Me. 309
(1853).
54. We are to consider all the words of the grant in light of the circum-
stances and conditions attending the transaction. But we must consider
and construe the grant according to settled rules of construction. They are
rules of property. And the security of real estate titles depends upon a
strict adherence to these rules of construction.
Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407, 413, 152 A. 413, 415-16 (1930). See also McLellan v.
McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 95 A. 1025 (1915); Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9 (1858).
55. See, eg., Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407, 152 A. 413 (1930); Sinford v. Watts, 123
Me. 230, 232, 122 A. 573, 574 (1923); McLellan v. McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 95 A.
1025 (1915); Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461, 54 A. 1115 (1903); Freeman v. Leighton,
90 Me. 541,38 A. 542 (1897); Snow v. Mt. Desert Island Real Estate Co., 84 Me. 14,
24 A. 429 (1891); Stevens v. King, 76 Me. 197 (1884); Nickerson v. Crawford, 16 Me.
245 (1839).
56. See generally McLellan v. McFadden, 114 Me. 242,95 A. 1025 (1915); Snow v.
Mt. Desert Island Real Estate Co., 84 Me. 14, 24 A. 429 (1891).
57. See Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407, 152 A. 413 (1930); Sinford v. Watts, 123 Me.
230, 232, 22 A. 573, 574 (1923); McLellan v. McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 95 A. 1025
(1915); Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461,54 A. 1115 (1903); Stevens v. King, 76 Me. 197
(1884); Nickerson v. Crawford, 16 Me. 245 (1839).
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themselves to convey the uplands without the lowlands."8 This is
true even when the measurements given do not extend further to-
ward the water than the edge of uplands.5 9 Furthermore, a descrip-
tion that cites only the area measuring the uplands is not persuasive
as conveying only the uplands-since the custom with surveyors de-
fining a complete property (both uplands and shorelands) often has
been to exclude from the description the area of flats and shore and
to cite only the area of the uplands even though both may be in-
tended to be conveyed.
A. Common Water Boundary Terms Used as Words of Separation
Terms often used as evidence of intent to separate the uplands
from the shore or flats include "by the bank," "along high water
mark," "high tide," "by the shore," "by the head of the cove," and
"along the near (or upland) shore."'60 The use of one of these terms
58. Wilson v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207, 213, 77 A. 787, 789 (1910) ("[A] deed
which describes a line along a nontidal river as running 'with' or along the stream, or
as running 'by' or 'on' the stream or 'up' or 'down' the stream, carries the title to the
center of the stream, unless the contrary appears... ."). See also Dunton v. Parker,
97 Me. 461, 54 A.2d 1115 (1903).
59. The general rule of construction may be thus stated; whenever land is
described as bounded by other land, or by a building or structure, the name
of which, according to its legal and ordinary meaning, includes the title in
the land of which it has been made a part, as a house, a mill, a wharf, or the
like, the side of the land or structure referred to as a boundary is the limit
of the grant; but when the boundary line is simply by an object, whether
natural or artificial, the name of which is used in ordinary speech as defin-
ing a boundary, and not as describing a title in fee, and which does not, in
its description or nature include the earth as far down as the grantor owns,
and yet which has width, as in case of a way, a river, a ditch, a wall, a fence,
a tree, or a stake and stone, then the center of the thing so running over or
standing on the land is the boundary of the lot granted .... And it is
undoubtedly true that where a grant is bounded upon a nonnavigable
fresh-water [sic] stream, a highway, a ditch or a party wall, or the like, such
stream, way, ditch or wall are to be deemed monuments, located equally
upon the land granted and the adjoining land, and in all such cases, the
grant extends to the center of such monument.
Coombs v. West, 115 Me. 489, 491-92, 99 A. 445 (1916) (quoting City of Boston v.
Richardson, 95 Mass. 146, 154 (1866); Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9,13 (1858)). The
Law Court in Haight v. Hamor, 83 Me. 453, 460-61, 22 A. 369 (1891) had stated
earlier:
The rule is well established when the road is the terminus ad quem, but
there is little authority when it is the terminus a quo, and there is no monu-
ment at the other end of the line. A majority of the court is of opinion that
it is a common method of measurement, in the country where the boundary
is a stream or way, to measure from the bank of the stream or the side of
the way, and that there is a reasonable presumption that the measurements
were made in this way, unless something appears affirmatively in the deed
to show that they began at the center line of the stream or way.
Id. at 372 (quoting Dodd v. Witt, 139 Mass. 63, 65 (1885)). Cf. Stevens v. King, 76
Me.. 197, 199-200 (1884).
60. Proctor v. Hinkley, 462 A.2d 465,467 (Me. 1983); McLellan v. McFadden, 114
Me. 242, 247, 95 A. 1025, 1028 (1915); Whitmore v. Brown, 100 Me. 410, 414-15, 61
A. 985, 987-88 (1905); Wilson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207, 212-13, 77 A. 787,
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with the preposition "to," a word of exclusion, often has been held
by the Law Court to limit the title to property above a line where
the monument coincides with the line of normal high water or high
tide.61 In other words, when the grantor conveys "to" one of these
monuments and then writes the description "along" the same monu-
ment or another similar monument, courts will presume such con-
veyances to exclude the shores or flats from the grant.6 Use of such
terms without "to," however, may not be conclusive in excluding
title to the lowlands. 63 For example, it is common for a description
to run not to a shoreland monument but to a fixed and tangible
monument such as a tree and then go "along" the water body. In
this situation, the conveyance extends ownership to the full limit of
the grantor's potential title in the water body. The monument near
the water is presumed merely to fix the direction from the previous
789-90 (1910); Brown v. Heard, 85 Me. 294,27 A. 182, 182 (1893); Bradford v. Cres-
sey, 45 Me. 9, 12 (1858).
61. "[T]he word 'to' is a word of exclusion rather than of inclusion." Dunton v.
Parker, 97 Me. 461,467, 54 A. 1115, 1118 (1903) (citation omitted). Cf. Hodgdon v.
Campbell, 411 A.2d 667 (Me. 1980); McLellan v. McFadden, 114 Me. 242,95 A. 1025
(1915); Wilson & Son v. Harrisburg, 107 Me. 207,77 A. 787 (1910); Proctor v. Rail-
road Co., 96 Me. 458,52 A. 933 (1902); Stone v. City of Augusta, 46 Me. 127 (1858).
62. See, e.g., Mansur v. Blake, 62 Me. 38, 41-42 (1873); Bradford v. Cressey, 45
Me. 9, 13-14 (1858).
63. In determining the construction of the description in a deed of land
upon the seashore, certain well-established general principles must be ap-
plied. By the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-7, it was provided that in such
cases, "the proprietor of the land adjoining shall have propriety to low
water mark," etc. By reason of this ordinance the owner of the upland
adjoining tide water prima facie owns to low water mark; and does so in
fact, unless the presumption is rebutted by proof to the contrary .... It is,
of course, true that the owner of upland and shore may separate the owner-
ship by the conveyance of one and the retention of the other, and, as has
frequently been decided n the states to which this ordinance is applicable,
where the side boundary line of the lot conveyed is "to the shore," andthenc  "by th  shore," the side lin termi at s at the inn r side of the
shore, an shows, in the absence of other calls or circumstances showing acontrary intention, that the inner side of the shore is i tended as the
boundary. That is, a call in a deed which describes a line as running to a
strip of land, whether shore or upland, does not carry the line over, across
or onto the strip referred to, because the word "to" is a word of exclusion
rather than of inclusion ....
But it does not by any means follow from the mere fact that the shore of
land adjoining tide waters is made a boundary, or that the boundary is "by
the shore," that it is by high water mark. The space between high and low
water mark, properly called the shore, is frequently of many rods in width,
it has an outer or seaward side and an inner or upland side, and, nothing
else appearing, a boundary by the shore may be as well intended to mean
the one as the other. To determine which side of the shore is intended as
the boundary it is necessary to look for something further. It follows, that
the starting point of a boundary "by the shore" is one of the important
elements in throwing light upon the question as to which margin of the
shore is intended, because, as we have already seen, low water mark is as
much the shore as is high water mark.
Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461, 467-68, 54 A. 1115, 1118 (1903) (citations omitted).
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upland monument toward the water body."a For example, if the de-
scription says in part "stone; thence S830E 102 rods to a tree on the
bank; thence along the pond," the tree serves to fix the boundary
from the stone to the tree. Implicit in such a description is the idea
that the boundary then runs down from the tree to the water (see
Part V of this Article), goes along the water, and includes the shores
and flats (see Part II of this Article).
B. Specific Principles in Construing Separation of Uplands
from Lowlands
When the intent to include, or exclude, lowlands from a convey-
ance is not clear from the deed, the Law Court has provided some
guiding principles for construing such conveyances. Each principle
is based on past and present actions involving the riparian land and
its conveyances.
1. Mix of Monuments Principle
If one or more calls in a deed are for the "water," while other calls
in the same deed are for the "shore" or "bank," the edge of the
shore or bank at the low water line is held to be what is meant by
the call for the "shore" or "bank., 65 By contrast, if the "shore" or
"bank" is called for in a description without mention of the water or
water's edge, it is presumed that the high water edge of the shore or
bank is what is meant.66
64. It is familiar law, however, that when land is described as bounded by
a monument standing on the bank ... [or] if the monument do[es] not
stand exactly on the bank but a short distance back from it-the monu-
ment then being referred to only as giving the direction of the line to the
stream and not as restricting the boundary on the stream.
Erskine v. Moulton, 66 Me. 276, 280 (1877); Cf. Mansur v. Blake, 62 Me. 38 (1873);
Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9 (1858).
65. Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. at 468-69, 54 A. 1115, 1118 (1903); Proctor v.
Maine Railroad Co., 96 Me. 458, 472-73, 52 A. 933, 937 (1902).
66. Running to a monument standing on the bank, and from thence run-
ning to the river, or along the river, &c., does not restrict the grant to the
bank of the stream; for the monuments, in such cases, are only referred to
as giving the direction of the lines to the river, and not as restricting the
boundary on the river. If the grantor, however, after giving the line to the
river, bounds his land by the bank of the river, or describes his line as
running along the bank of the river, or bounds it upon the margin of the
river, he shows that he does not consider the whole alveus of the stream a
mere mathematical line, so as to carry his grant to the middle of the river.
And it appears to me equally clear that the grant is restricted when it is
bounded by the shore of the river, as in the present case.
Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. at 13-14 (quoting Child v. Starr, 4 Hill 369 at 375). See
also Snow v. Mt. Desert Island Real Estate Co., 84 Me. 14, 17,24 A. 429,430 (1891)
(holding that where the terms "the sea" or "the shore" are used in a deed to desig-
nate a boundary, they include the beach to the low-water mark).
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2. Long Uncontested Possession Principle
The intended boundary is deemed to be the high water edge of
the shore or bank when a conveyance uses a term other than "the
water" as the call for a boundary monument and the conveyance is
followed by a long uncontested possession of the shore or flats by
someone not claiming title through the grantee.67 This was fre-
quently the situation around mill ponds where the mill owner in-
tended to retain the title to boom the logs at the shore or where the
grantor had erected fishing weirs and continued to maintain them
after the conveyance. Unfortunately for the practitioner seeking to
clarify title to such riparian land, evidence affirming uncontested
historical possession, such as the booming of logs or the existence of
fishing weirs, may have disappeared over time.
3. Value Apart Principle
Whether the flats or shore are capable of being separated from
the uplands, and whether such separation is worthwhile, may serve
as evidence of an intent to separate the lowlands from the uplands.
A separate conveyance of the shore or flats from the uplands may
be considered reasonable intent when activities have been carried
on along the water that have not needed the support of the uplands
to make them valuable. Examples of such activities include fishing,
log booming, and salt grass cultivation.'
4. Separated and Brought Back Principle
It is possible for one part of a deed to be construed to exclude the
water, while a later part of the same deed brings the water back.69
A qualifying clause of the deed, or other documents cited in the
property description, may be used to determine the ultimate intent
of the grantor to retain the lowlands with the uplands.70
67. See, eg., McLellan v. McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 248-49, 95 A. 1025, 1028-29
(1915).
68. See, eg., Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. at 412, 152 A. at 415; McLellan v. McFadden,
114 Me. at 248-49, 95 A. at 1028-29; Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461,467, 54 A. 1115,
1118 (1903); Clancey v. Houdlette, 39 Me. 451, 457-58 (1855).
69. Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667, 672 (Me. 1980).
70. Snow v. Mt. Desert Island Real Estate Co., 84 Me. at 16, 24 A. at 429. See
also Seekins v. Lougee, 152 Me. 153, 156, 125 A.2d 916, 917-18 (1956); Dunton v.
Parker, 97 Me. at 468, 54 A. at 1118; Dillingham v. Roberts, 75 Me. 469, 471-72
(1883); Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Me. 169, 182 (1848); Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85,
91-92 (1831). In Whitmore v. Brown, 100 Me. 410, 416-17, 61 A. at 985, 988 (1905),
the court stated that the words "together with all the privileges and appurtenances
thereto belonging" do not convey the shore and flats. In Snow v. Mt Desert Island
Real Estate Co., the court stated that the right in the shore is a fee ownership subject
to a public servitude, but as that is usually regarded as an appurtenance, it is owner-
ship, not an easement. However, it cannot be conveyed as an appurtenance because
land cannot be appurtenant to land, only an easement or the like can be an
appurtenance.
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5. Islands Principle
Islands seemingly connected to the mainland by shore or flats are
treated different from other uplands. Islands lying within 100 rods
(1650 feet) of the mainland uplands do not include any shores or
flats that extend between the island and the mainland.71 The island
does, however, include the flats extending to the seaward side or on
all sides where there is a channel or where 100 rods distance has
limited the mainland owner's claim to the flats.72
Figure 8
water
water
water
Mainland
Mainland
©®
One: If the flats are continuous between the island and mainland, they are part of
the title to the mainland. Two: If there is a channel between the island and the
mainland, each owner takes title to the flats on his respective side of the channel.
Three: The mainland owner can claim title to all flats within 100 rods. Beyond 100
rods, the owner of an island can claim title to any flats within 100 rods of the island's
shore.
71. Babson v. Thinter, 79 Me. 368, 372, 10 A. 63, 64 (1887). See also Thornton v.
Foss, 26 Me. 402,405 (1847) (holding that where title to islands extends to low water
mark, title includes flats lying between islands and low water mark and not to flats to
right or left of land not covered by water at low tide).
72. Cf Babson v. Tainter, 79 Me. at 372, 10 A. at 65.
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V. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF BOUNDARIES THAT CROSS
UNSURVEYED RIPARIAN LANDS
The title rights discussed to this point have focused on boundaries
that are approximately parallel with the water's edge. A different
circumstance arises, however, when a boundary is marked by a pin
on the bank beyond the water's highest reach but the riparian owner
has title beyond the pin, perhaps all the way to the water's edge.
Unfortunately for the owner, the conveyance may fail to define and
locate the boundary crossing the intervening area, from the farthest
reach of the water up the bank or shore to the extent of title along
or in the water body.73 Consequently, courts have had to provide
guidance on how to locate the boundary from the edge of the up-
lands, across the lowlands, to the limit of title.
A. Competing Doctrines of Construction
Courts in Maine and other states have adopted rules of construc-
tion in order to provide guidance on how to locate boundaries that
cross water or cross uplands to reach water. These rules of construc-
tion are used in conjunction with a riparian grant that has failed to
locate the boundaries crossing the flats.74 The courts have at-
tempted to fix a method that is equitable, functional, and easy to
understand and apply. The various methods courts have considered
at one time or another are summarized as 1) extension of the prop-
erty line, 2) proportionment, 3) the colonial method, and 4) the per-
pendicular method.
1. The Extension Method
Extension of a property line means staying on the same azimuth
as the upland boundary that leads to the water. This method is
often used because of its simplicity.75 However, without an express
requirement from the operative conveyance that the boundary be so
extended, this method can produce ludicrous results in some situa-
tions and inequitable results in others.7 6 Where boundary lines
cross the uplands at an angle oblique to the water's edge, the lines
can diverge or converge to such a degree that the upland owner's
boundary stops short of the water. In addition, the resulting water
73. See, eg., Emerson v. Taylor, 9 Me. 42, 47 (1832).
74. The rule by which the mention of a way as a boundary in a convey-
ance of land is presumed to mean the middle of the way, if the way belongs
to the grantor, is not an absolute rule of law irrespective of manifest inten-
tion, like the rule in Shelley's case, but is merely a principle of interpreta-
tion adopted for the purpose of finding out the true meaning of the words
used.
Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407, 413, 152 A. 413, 416 (1930) (quoting Crocker v. Cotting,
166 Mass. 183, 185, 44 N.E. 214 (1896)).
75. See generally Proctor v. IFinkley, 462 A.2d 465 (Me. 1983).
76. See e.g., Treat v. Chapman, 35 Me. 34 (1852).
1995]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
Figure 9
Low ater High Water
Surveyed Lines
Extensions
In this example, extending the boundaries causes them to intersect prior to reaching
low water. This denies the owner access to the water and leaves the common bound-
ary between the adjoining lots uncertain. Even if the lines were to reach the water
before they intersect, one parcel may have its water frontage limited inequitably as a
result of the direction of a common side boundary.
frontage may be reduced or enlarged to such an extent as to unjustly
enrich one neighbor while denying another almost all benefit of
water frontage (see Figure 9).
2. The Proportionment Method
The proportionment method is used to set waterfront boundaries
for adjoining properties. It requires that boundary termini along the
water be fixed proportionate to the length of the respective proper-
ties' boundaries along the previously surveyed upland (see Figure
10).
This method, like the extension method above, may produce un-
desirable results. In order to apply the proportionment method, the
actual ownership boundary (which one is seeking to fix) must join
the original, surveyed boundary at some point to provide a corner
point of beginning. This point of beginning is needed to start mea-
surements from when marking off succeeding properties' propor-
tional boundary measures. Consequently, if the low water line does
not touch the line of actual survey at some point, the proportion-
ment method cannot be employed. This is a common situation
along some stream channels, great ponds, or islands. In other cases,
the point of intersection is ambiguous or some distance away and
requires considerable research and survey efforts to locate, making
the proportionment method very costly. The proportionment
method also is susceptible to variations when the length of a bound-
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Figure 10
20.3 24.1
2)_ A
Lots 154.3
134.1 Water
102.1 OB 487.2
"@ (total distance along ownership line)
Former surveyed line Ownership line
/"h _20.3.
20.3 1-2 1-kAnew 0. 487.2=24.1
154.3 2-3 10.3
134.1 3-4 A-( )new 15 487.2 = 183.0
102.1 4-5 410.8
_134.1
410.8 B-0, new 410.8' 4872 = 159.0C-@ 102.1
c= 10. 487.2 = 121.1410.8 47.487.2
The extent of ownership and the former survey line coincide at corner points I and
5. Between these points, the boundaries must be established across the flats to the
water. To fix points A, B, and C, a proportion of the recorded distances between
points 1 and 5 is equated to a proportion of the present frontage between points I
and 5. The resulting calculations give distances to be measured from a known
comuer.
ary changes because of accretion and erosion. Any physical change
in the frontage, regardless of where the change occurs, will change
the ownership boundaries in front of the parcel in question, thus
changing the dependent proportions of the total frontage. For ex-
ample, erosion in front of a neighbor's lot may decrease the total of
all neighbors' frontage. As a consequence, the length of each par-
cel, part of the total frontage in question, loses a proportional part
of its frontage even though the erosion was along a limited section
in front of a single parcel. As an added problem, because of the
dependency of each lot comer to other lot comers, all lot owners
may have to be joined as parties in any litigation between two feud-
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ing parties in order to fix mutually proportioned waterfront
boundaries.77
Proportioning is appropriately used to fix the termini of adjoined
boundaries when 1) the lot was created as part of a plan of lots and
the deed refers to the overall plan; 2) the plan shows the corners
terminating at the great pond, the tidal water, or the thread of the
river; 3) one or more monuments were not set or their former posi-
tion can no longer be determined; and 4) there is excess or defi-
ciency between the recorded distance and actual distance along the
water frontage between existing monuments or former positions
(see Figure 11).78
Figure 11
As seen in Figure 11, this subdivision plan extends the boundary to the water giving
no indication that the survey or description stops the boundary short of the absolute
limit of title. When old plans are retraced with modem equipment, the record mea-
surements typically do not match the retracement measurements. This situation re-
quires reproportioning the frontage to establish the location of the entire side
boundaries.
3. The Colonial Method
The colonial method was adopted early in Maine's history and
was limited to use in those areas governed by the Massachusetts Co-
77. See, e.g., Reitz v. Knight, 814 P.2d 1212 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
78. Brown v. Gay, 3 Me. 126 (1824).
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lonial Ordinance that dealt with water affected by the tides.79 This
method for apportioning flats among adjoining upland properties is
not appropriate in all situations.' ° The advantage of the colonial
method over the other methods is that, once determined, the direc-
tion of the boundaries remains fixed regardless of additional
shorefront accretions or erosions. Determining a common bound-
ary for adjoining properties across flats or water by this method de-
pends solely on existing comers of the adjoining properties.
The colonial method was first described by the court as follows:
The mode of applying the principle is this. Draw a base line
from the two corners of each lot, where they strike the shore;
and from those two corners, extend parallel lines to low water
mark, at right angles with the base line. If the line of the shore
be straight, as in the case before us, there will be no interfer-
ence in running the parallel lines. If the flats lie in a cove, of a
regular or irregular curvature, there will be an interference in
running such lines, and the loss occasioned by it must be
equally borne or gain enjoyed equally by the contiguous own-
ers ....
8 1
The colonial method sees to it that loss or accretion gain is "borne
equally" by adjoining property owners; it sets as the direction of
their common boundary the average or mean bearing of the two
lines drawn across the fronts of their contiguous properties (see Fig-
ure 12).
79. Emerson v. Taylor, 9 Me. 42 (1832). See also Call v. Carroll, 40 Me. 31
(1855).
80. Babson v. Tainter, 79 Me. 368,371, 10 A. 63,64 (1887) ("No rule can compass
all cases. The Massachusetts court has adopted different rules for different classes of
cases, and has frequently had occasion to remark upon the difficulty and embarrass-
ment attending a practical application of any construction of the ordinance.").
We are not aware of any cases, where, in apportioning appurtenant flats
among contiguous owners of upland, the foregoing principles and mode of
proceeding would not be properly applicable as the rule of decision. Still
we do not undertake to affirm that there may not be some peculiarity in the
form of the upland to which flats are appurtenant, and some peculiarity of
manner in which the upland may be divided among contiguous owners, the
effect of which we have not anticipated, which would vary the principle.
Should any such cases hereafter present themselves, requiring the applica-
tion of a different principle, such new principle must of course be applied.
Emerson v. Taylor, 9 Me. at 46.
81. Emerson v. Taylor, 9 Me. at 44-45.
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Figure 12-Steps 1 & 2
Water Ownership line
Land S ey line
Step 1: Connect adjoining comers forming lines 1 & 2
Survey line
Step 2: Strike an average direction between lines 1 & 2
The figure illustrates the steps necessary to use the colonial method properly. As
seen from the figure, this method is dependent on being able to fix corner locations
in addition to the joint corner in question.
The colonial method has three problems. First, it may cause ad-
joining property boundaries across flats to intersect before reaching
a property's limit at or across water. This is the same problem that
can occur with extension of an upland boundary, although it hap-
pens less frequently with the colonial method. Second, the proper
application of this method requires that all comers on the water side
of adjoining properties be identified. The researcher, or more likely
the surveyor, may need to perform tedious research, possibly to the
earliest grants dealing with the land, and may need to survey one or
more adjoining parcels in order to recover the necessary adjoining
corners. Third, equitable application of this method requires adjoin-
ing comers used in the calculation to have been created at the same
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time as or prior to the creation of the corner under scrutiny.' Fail-
ure to consider the history of adjoining comers will cause the
boundary to change with each new subdivision.' In order to use
the colonial method, research to the point of common ownership is
required for all adjoining parcels and surveying is required to reach
even the far comers of parcels that do not adjoin the parcel in ques-
tion (see Figure 13).
Figure 13
Erroneous shift caused by creation of new comer and
not co sidering history of comers.
and New Division Line
Property Lines_____________
Referring to the properties in Figure 12, one can see that a new division line inter-
posed between the original property lines will cause the colonial method boundary
established in the previous figure to shift if the historical creation of each boundary
is not considered.
4. The Perpendicular Method
The perpendicular method fixes the boundary reaching across
flats or shore at the shortest distance between the actual ownership
line and the known surveyed comer on the upland. The line of
shortest distance is that line perpendicular (or normal) to the line of
ownership (see Figure 14).
82. See Call v. Carroll, 40 Me. 31, 34 (1855).
83. Id
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Figure 14
Ownership line (center)
Surveyed line
comrer by previous survey
Stream Channel
From the present terminus of the side boundaries, a straight line is extended to the
line of ownership along a direction that allows for the shortest distance to the own-
ership line. The resulting line created is always perpendicular to the line of owner-
ship at the point of intersection.
The perpendicular method always will provide the property
owner frontage, is easy to apply, and does not require costly re-
search and field survey beyond the parcel in question. Its only limi-
tation is the rare situation when two or more points along the line of
ownership may be the same distance from the terminus of the
boundary. This situation is extremely rare given the typical irregu-
larities of shores and water courses and the precision of modern
equipment that recognizes even small differentiation between what
appear otherwise to be equivalent choices. Many courts in other
states have applied this method for all riparian land.' The Law
Court in dicta appears to have adopted this method for nontidal
bodies of water."
B. Recommendation
The colonial method has been the accepted method in Maine for
extending a property's side boundaries across shorelands to tidal
water when they are not otherwise marked or described in the oper-
84. See, eg., State v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 416 P.2d 675 (Wash. 1966);
Tauscher v. Andruss, 401 P.2d 40 (Or. 1965); Driesbach v. Lynch, 234 P.2d 446
(Idaho 1951).
85. Shawmut Mfg. v. Town of Benton, 123 Me. 121, 124, 122 A. 49, 50 (1923)
("By implication of law, in the absence of negativing words, the side lines of a ripa-
rian proprietor, whose estate is bounded by an innavigable river, are extended from
the termini on the margin, at right angles from the stream, to include one-half of the
bed of the river.").
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ative conveyance. The perpendicular method has been suggested by
the Law Court to be the proper method for extending boundaries to
nontidal waters where they have not been previously surveyed or
described. However, under some conditions where a boundary has
been previously described to the limit of ownership but its physical
location is now unknown, Maine common law has applied the pro-
portionment method to fix boundaries at the water edge extent of
ownership.
The method for extending side boundaries toward water that is
easiest to apply, least costly, and most effective is the perpendicular
method. This method is independent of subsequent variations that
occur on, or are present on, nearby riparian parcels. The perpendic-
ular method is easily applied by the layperson and the surveyor.
Most important, this method always assigns water frontage regard-
less of the existing boundary or ownership line configuration. A ri-
parian landowner should not be forced to survey a neighbor's
property, research ancient titles, and spend considerable money on
attorney and survey fees to find out where her boundary resides.
The perpendicular method would not only avoid these onerous re-
quirements but spare the landowner being assigned boundary exten-
sions that never reach the water. Using the perpendicular method
the landowner starts at the corner shared with her neighbor on the
bank and establishes her boundary in the direction that gives the
shortest distance to the water.
Consider the following sequence of figures illustrating the various
locations assigned for the common boundary between lot 1 and lot 2
(along a great pond) as defined by the several methods discussed.
Figure 15
Low W ater :.: ... .......
Present Configuration
-... .:. 
- :::. ;:..
Figure 15 shows the present boundary configuration for lots 1-4, where described
boundaries stop short of the low water's edge.
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Figure 16
Extension of the present boundaries denies lot 1 frontage along the low water. A
triangular overlap results on lot 2, while the ownership of the fiats west of lot 1 Is
unknown.
Figure 17
123.1 * 1,156.2
1567.3
167.3* 1,156.2
1567.3
Record
Distances
167.3
123.1
675.3
245.1
256.3
100.2
1567.3
= 90.8
= 123.4
The proportionment method requires extensive surveying all along lots 1-4 and be-
yond. Intervening points for all the lots along the low water have to be established
in order to establish the common boundary between lot 1 and lot 2.
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Figure 18
The colonial method requires considerable survey effort and research to locate adja-
cent boundaries of the same age or older than the boundary in question. The
method produces a ludicrous result by actually cutting off some of the uplands
thought to belong to lot 2, reducing the shoreline of lot 2, and giving lot I shoreline
and upland that it cannot effectively use.
Figure 19
Using the perpendicular method, the common boundary between lot 1 and lot 2 is
simply the shortest distance to the low water. There is no need for extensive survey-
ing, extensive research, or locating other intermediate boundaries.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The practitioner involved with a conveyance along a water body
must understand and be able to explain the extent of title, limita-
tions on the title, and how boundaries may be fixed and extended.
In most cases, the owner of land bordering on a water body has title
extending across the shore beyond the normal reach of high water.
Where the title does extend beyond the reach of high water, the
public often has certain rights beyond the high water line. In some
cases, persons may have extended their use of a client's shorefront
beyond what is permitted by these public rights. It is in the client's
best interest to know this. For parcels bordering a great pond, the
public's right to pass over property by foot to access the great pond
should be brought to the client's attention. A great deal of confu-
sion and litigation has involved riparian title and the location of
boundaries on or near water. Knowing the common law rules of
construction as well as boundary definition methods for waterfront
property can avoid such confusion.
